In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.
condition in terms of the decisive pairs) then it is acyclic if and only if its index exceeds the cardinality of the set of alternatives. These results are available in Banks (1995) . The literature discussed above is based on assumptions that allow for preference profiles to vary. This flexibility allows considerable "degrees of freedom" that may not be available once we adhere to a fixed preference profile. Even with a fixed preference profile there are several ways of aggregating the individual preferences into a social welfare relation. Naturally we would want all such relations to be Paretian, i.e. if all individuals prefer x to y, then society should also prefer x to y and this should be reflected in the social welfare relation. However unless all individuals have identical preferences, the assumption that the social welfare relation is Paretian is not sufficient to identify a unique social preference. Thus questions similar to those that arise in the multiprofile set up can be addressed in a single profile world. Papers by Parks (1976) , Hammond (1976) , Kemp and Ng (1976) , Pollack (1979) , Roberts (1980) , Rubinstein (1984) and more recently Feldman and Serrano (2008) show that if enough "diversity" is allowed in the given single preference profile, then under reasonable (or mild) assumptions impossibility of aggregation follows. The starting point of our paper is the single profile framework as discussed in Feldman and Serrano (2008) . In that paper it is shown that an assumption called "diversity under minimal decisiveness" leads to dictatorial social welfare relations, although unlike the multi-profile world dictatorship provides wider scope for interpretation in the single profile world. In our paper we ask the following question: Is there any known condition for aggregation procedures in multi-profile contexts to be acyclic that can be adapted to the single-profile framework and yield a similar result? In order to answer this question we retain the Neutrality/monotonicity assumption in Feldman and Serrano (2008) . This assumption says that if for all x,y,z,w agents who prefer x to y continue to prefer w to z, agents who prefer z to w also prefer y to x and society prefers x to y, then society also prefers w to z. We introduce the concept of a decisive pair along the lines suggested in Banks (1995) . Further concepts such as collegium of a collection of decisive sets and collegiality of a social welfare relation are adapted from Banks (1995) . Since there is limited maneuverability in a single profile world we modify the concept of a decisive set and call it "properly decisive". This is done to preempt both a pair of coalitions and the pair formed by its complements from being decisive. In fact there are straightforward examples that illustrate how mere decisiveness is vulnerable to ambiguities. The index of a social welfare relation is defined as the cardinality of the smallest collection of decisive pairs whose collegium is empty. The index* of a social welfare relation is defined as the cardinality of the smallest collection of properly decisive pairs whose collegium is empty. If there is no such collection then the index* of the social welfare relation is plus infinity. Unlike the multi-profile context the single profile condition for a social welfare relation to be acyclic is only a sufficient condition and not a necessary one. We are able to show that if the index* of a social welfare relation is greater than the cardinality of the set of alternatives, then the social welfare relation is a social decision relation, i.e. it is acyclic. We achieve this by adjusting the first half of the proof of theorem 2 in Banks (1995), although our result relates more to theorem 4 in the paper just cited. We also show that the converse is not in general true, i.e. there are single-profile aggregation problems with an acyclic social welfare relation whose index* is less than the cardinality of the set of alternatives. This is accomplished by using example 6 of Feldman and Serrano (2008). Each agent i∈N is assumed to have preferences over the set of alternatives which is represented by a binary relation R i . We assume that each R i is reflexive (i.e. for all x∈X: xR i x), connected (i.e. for all x,y∈X with x ≠ y: either xR i y or yR i x) and transitive (i.e. for all x,y,z∈X: [xR i y, yR i z] implies [xR i z]). Note that a binary relation that is reflexive and connected is also said to be complete. R i is said to be the preference ordering of i. The interpretation of xR i y is that individual i considers alternative x to be "at least as good as" alternative y. The asymmetric part of R i will be denoted P i (instead of P(R i )) and the symmetric part of R i will be denoted I i (instead of I(R i )). The interpretation of xP i y is that individual i "prefers" alternative x to alternative y; the interpretation of xI i y is that individual i is "indifferent between" x and y. The ordered n-tuple (R 1 ,…,R n ) is called the preference profile (of the society). In the current framework there is only one preference profile and we shall not be concerned with situations where society can (or needs to) contemplate alternative preference profiles. A binary relation R is said to be acyclic if there does not exist a positive integer K ≥ 2 and distinct alternatives x 1 , x 2 ,…,x K ∈X: (i) for all i = 1,…, K-1 it is the case that x i P(R)x i+1 ; (ii) x K P(R)x 1 . The problem we are concerned with in this paper concerns aggregating the given preference profile (R 1 ,…,R n ) into a binary relation that society may use in arriving at a decision. Apart from assuming that such a binary relation is "truly representative" of the society we shall also require that it is asymmetric and acyclic. In the present scenario we will refer (as in Lahiri (2009)) to an asymmetric binary relation on X as a social welfare relation and to an asymmetric and acyclic binary relations on X as a social decision relation. In multi-profile contexts where preference profiles are variable, a function that assigns to each preference profile a asymmetric and acyclic binary relation (representing the preferences of society) is called a social decision function as for instance in Blau and Deb (1977) or Gaertner (2006) . The reason why we refer to asymmetric and acyclic binary relations as social decision relations is because on every non-empty finite subset of X such a relation will have at least one maximal element. While generic elements of X are represented by the letters x,y,z etc. specific elements will be represented by the letters a,b,c etc.
A social decision relation P is said to be Paretian if for all x,y∈X: [xP i y for all i∈N] implies [xPy].
If P is Paretian then given any x,y in X if all individuals prefer x to y, it must be that society prefers x to y.
The following notation has been adapted from Banks (1995) . For x,y∈X, let P(x,y) = {i∈N/ xP i y} and R(x,y) = {i∈N/xR i y}.
A social welfare relation P is said to satisfy Neutrality/monotonicity if for all x,y,z,w∈X: [P(x,y) ⊂ P(w,z), R(x,y) ⊂ R(w,z) and xPy] implies [wPz].
In Feldman and Serrano (2008) a set of individuals V is said to be decisive (for a social welfare relation P) if it is nonempty and if, for all x,y∈X: V ⊂ P(x,y), then xPy. For our purposes the following definition adapted from Banks (1995) will turn out to be more convenient. An individual i is said to be a dictator (for a social welfare relation P) if for all x,y∈X: [xP i y] implies [xPy] . Thus if at the given profile it is the case that for all x,y∈X we have xI i y, then individual i is a dictator.
Given a social welfare relation P, let ∆ P = {(S,W) ⊂ N×N: (S,W) is a decisive pair for P}. If P is Paretian then ∆ P is non-empty since (N,N)∈∆ P . Further, if P satisfies Neutrality/monotonicity then for all x,y∈X such that xPy we have (P(x,y), R(x,y)) ∈ ∆ P . In what follows we shall assume that a social welfare relation is Paretian and satisfies Neutrality/monotonicity.
Collegial social decision relations:
Let P be a social welfare relation. Given a nonempty subset ∆of ∆ P , the collegium of ∆, denoted κ(∆) is the set
Thus κ(∆) is the set of those individuals who belong to every W and some S in ∆. We say that a social decision relation P is collegial if for every non-empty subset ∆of ∆ P , the collegium of ∆ is non-empty. For a social welfare relation P, let v(P) = + ∞ if P is collegial = min{|∆|: ∆⊂∆ P , ∆≠φ and κ(∆) = φ} otherwise. v(P) is called the index of P.
for a voting rule to be acyclic is that the index of the voting rule is less than the number of alternatives, i.e. the cardinality of X. Our definition of collegium, collegial social welfare relations and index has been adapted from Banks (1995) . So it is natural to try and see whether we get a result similar to the one by Banks in our context and if not the reasons for failure should be non-trivial. It turns out (as we shall see later) that the index of a social welfare relation being less than the cardinality of the set of alternatives is sufficient for social welfare relations to be social decision relation, i.e. acyclic. However for acyclicity it is not necessary that the index be less than the cardinality of X. The reason is quite trivial as the following example reveals.
Example 1: Let n = 3 and X = {a,b,c}. Suppose aP 1 bP 1 c, cP 2 bP 2 a and cP 3 aP 3 b. It is easy to see that majority rule is transitive leading to the social decision relation P = P 3 . In fact individual 3 is a dictator in spite of majority rule since individual 1's preferences are exactly opposed to the preferences of individual 2. It is easy to observe that {1,2} as well as {3} are decisive in the sense of Feldman and Seranno (2008) and thus ({1,2}, {1,2}) as well as ({3}, {3}) belong to ∆ P . Let ∆ = ({1,2}, {1,2}), ({2}, {2})}. Clearly κ(∆) is empty. Thus v(P) = 2 < 3 = |X|, i.e. the index of P is less than the cardinality of X. However P is definitely acyclic. The trouble with the example above is that the coalition {1,2} is vacuously decisive since there does not exist any x,y∈X such that xP i y for i = 1,2! The above phenomenon leads to both {1,2} as well as its complement {3} being decisive. In order to prevent both (S,W) as well as (S', W') with S' ⊂ N \ W and W' ⊂ N \ S from being in the reckoning we formulate the following concept similar to one available in Banks (1995) .
Given a social welfare relation P, a decisive pair (S,W) for P is said to be proper if there exists x,y∈X such that P(x,y) = S and R(x,y) = W. In such a situation we also say that (S,W) is properly decisive (for P).
Suppose (S,W) is properly decisive for P. Let S = P(a,b) and W = R(a,b). Thus aPb. Towards a contradiction suppose there exists (S', W') where S' ⊂ N \ W = P(b,a) and W' ⊂ N \ S = R(b,a) such that (S', W') is decisive. Since S' ⊂ P(b,a) and W' ⊂ R(b,a) we get bPa contradicting the asymmetry of P. Hence (S',W') cannot be decisive and hence cannot be properly decisive either. It is worth noting that if instead of requiring P(x,y) = S and R(x,y) = W in the definition of properly decisive pairs, we had merely required the decisive pair (S,W) to satisfy S ⊂ P(x,y) and W ⊂ R(x,y) for some x,y in X then we would land up with the potentially problematic situation where ({i}, {i}) is a properly decisive pair for all i∈N, when R i = R j for all i,j∈N. The collegium of {({i}, {i}), ({j}, {j})}for i,j∈N with i≠j is empty. Thus v(P) < 3 ≤ |X|. However given that the social welfare relation P is Paretian, we get P = P i for all i∈N if R i = P i ∪{(x,x):x∈X}. Thus once again the necessity of (some version of) the index property for the existence of a social decision relation breaks down for a very trivial reason. It is worth noting that (N,N) may not be properly decisive unless there exists x,y∈X such that P(x,y) = N. In fact it is quite possible that (S,W) is properly decisive whereas (S', W') with S⊂ S'⊂W' is not simply because there does not exist x,y∈X with P(x,y) = S' and R(x,y) = W'. This of course is a drawback in our definition of proper decisive sets which does not appear to be easily remediable.
Properly decisive pairs and weakly collegial relations:
Given a social welfare relation let 0 P ∆ = {(S,W)∈∆ P : (S,W) is proper}.
We say that a social welfare relation P is weakly collegial if for every non-empty subset ∆of 0 P ∆ , the collegium of ∆ is non-empty.
It is easy to see that if P is collegial then it is weakly collegial. Proof of Claim 1: Let P be a social welfare relation and let xPy. Towards a contradiction suppose that P(x,y) = φ. Thus R(y,x) = N. Thus P(x,y)⊂ P(y,x) and R(x,y)⊂ R(y,x). By Neutrality/monotonicity xPy implies yPx, contradicting the asymmetry of P. Thus P(x,y) ≠φ. Q.E.D. Proof of Claim 2: Let P be a social welfare relation and let xPy. Let S = P(x,y) and W = R(x,y). By Neutrality/ monotonicity, for all w,z∈X: [S ⊂ P(w,z), W⊂ R(w,z)] implies [wPz] . By Claim 1, S ≠φ and hence W ≠φ. Thus (S,W)∈∆ P and since S = P(x,y), W = R(x,y), (S,W)∈ 0 P ∆ . Q.E.D.
For a social welfare relation P, let v*(P) = + ∞ if P is weakly collegial = min{|∆|: ∆⊂ 0 P ∆ , ∆≠φ and κ(∆) = φ} otherwise.
v*(P) is called the index* of P. If v(P) = +∞ then so is v*(P). If v(P) < +∞, then since v(P) = min{|∆|: ∆⊂∆ P , ∆≠φ and κ(∆) = φ}≤ min{|∆|: ∆⊂ 0 P ∆ , ∆≠φ and κ(∆) = φ} ≤ v*(P), we get that in any case v(P) ≤ v*(P).
We can now obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let P be a (Paretian) social welfare relation (that satisfies Neutrality/monotonicity). If v*(P) >|X| then P is a social decision relation, i.e. P is acyclic. However the converse is not in general true.
In the statement of Claims 1 and 2 and Proposition 1 we have purposely put the two phrases in parenthesis, since given our blanket assumption that all social welfare relations being considered here are Paretian and satisfy Neutrality/monotonicity we do not need to mention them explicitly once again. Our purpose in mentioning the two properties explicitly in the statement of the proposition is purely for the purpose of emphasis and recall.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let P be a social welfare relation such that v*(P) > |X|. Towards a contradiction suppose P is not acyclic. Thus there exists a positive integer K ≥ 2 and distinct alternatives x 1 , x 2 ,…,x K ∈X: (i) for all k = 1,…, K-1 it is the case that x k Px k+1 ; (ii) x K Px 1 . Thus K ≤ |X| < v*(P). Let S k = P(x k , x k+1 ) and W k = R(x k , x k+1 ) for k = 1,…, K-1; let S K = P(x K , x 1 ) and W K = R(x K , x 1 ). By Claim 1, for k = 1,…,K: S k ≠ φ. Let i∈κ(∆). Thus x k R i x k+1 for k = 1,…,K-1, x K R i x 1 and [either x k P(R i )x k+1 for some k = 1,…,K-1 or x K P(R i )x 1 ]. This contradicts the transitivity of R i . Hence P must be acyclic. To show that the converse is not true, let n = 3 and X = {a,b,c,d}. Consider the following preference profile: 1) aP 1 bP 1 cP 1 d; 2) cP 2 aP 2 bP 2 d; 3) aP 3 cP 3 bP 3 d. Let P be the social welfare relation obtained by applying the pair-wise majority rule. Thus aPcPbPd, aPb, cPd, aPd. Since P is transitive it is acyclic. Observe the following:
(1) ({1,2}, {1,2}) is a properly decisive pair since it is a decisive pair and {1,2} = P(b,d) = R(b,d).
(2) ({1,3}, {1,3}) is a properly decisive pair since it is a decisive pair and {1,3} = P(a,c) = R(a,c).
